

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 PM-04 INR-07 L-03  
ACDA-07 NSAE-00 PA-01 SS-15 PRS-01 SP-02 USIA-06  
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1364

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 USNATO 0444

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: NATO, PFOR, PARM  
SUBJ: INTERNATIONAL STAFF PAPER ON WARSAW PACT SUMMIT MEETING

REF: A) 76 USNATO 7041, B) 76 USNATO 6902, C) 76 STATE 303400,  
D) 76 STATE 300158

1. INTERNATIONAL STAFF (IS) HAS CIRCULATED A DRAFT  
ASSESSMENT OF THE DOCUMENTS ADOPTED AT THE NOVEMBER  
25-26, 1976 MEETING OF THE WARSAW PACT POLITICAL CON-  
SULTATIVE COMMITTEE. THE PAPER DRAWS ON NATIONAL  
CONTRIBUTIONS, INCLUDING A US ASSESSMENT (REF D).  
PARAGRAPHS 14-17 OF THE DRAFT WERE CIRCULATED IN FRENCH  
AND WE HAVE MADE AN INFORMAL TRANSLATION OF THIS  
PORTION OF THE PAPER. WE FIND THAT THE IS DRAFT AN ADE-  
QUATE COMPILATION OF THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE BUCHAREST  
DOCUMENTS AND IS GENERALLY COMPATIBLE WITH THE US ANALYSIS  
IN REF D. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THE PAPER WOULD BE  
IMPROVED BY SOMED PRUNING AND EDITING AND WE WOULD PLAN  
TO MAKE SUGGESTIONS IN THIS DIRECTION AT THE  
POLADS DISCUSSION OF THE DRAFT ON FEBRUARY 1.  
IF THE DEPARTMENT HAS ANY SPECIFIC POINTS WHICH  
IT BELIEVES WE SHOULD MAKE, WE WOULD  
APPRECIATE RECEIVING THESE.

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2. ACTION REQUEST: WASHINGTON GUIDANCE, IF POSSIBLE,  
BY FEBRUARY 1.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

I. INTRODUCTION

1. THE LEITMOTIV OF THE BUCHAREST DOCUMENTS(1) IS THE  
FURTHER "STRUGGLE FOR PEACE AND THE DEEPENING OF THE RELAXATION  
OF TENSION, THE CONSOLIDATION OF SECURITY AND THE DEVELOPING OF CO-

ORDINATION IN EUROPE", CONTAINING A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC, BUT LARGELY FAMILIARY PROPOSALS IN EACH OF THESE FIELDS. ALTHOUGH THE DOCUMENTS CONTAIN THE USUAL REFERENCES TO UNNAMED FORCES OF "REACTION, MILITARISM, AND REVANCHISM" WHICH, BY THEIR NEFARIOUS PRACTICES, CREATE DIFFICULTIES IN ACHIEVING PROGRESS TOWARDS THESE AIMS, THEIR TONE IS, ON THE WHOLE, MODERATE, AVOIDING IDEOLOGICAL HARANGUE.

2. THEIR OVERALL PURPOSE SEEMS TO BE:

- TO GIVE NEW IMPETUS TO THE PROMOTION OF SOVIET AND WP POLITICAL AIMS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS;
- TO PROVIDE A DETAILED FRAMEWORK TO COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS, PARTIES AND MASS MOVEMENTS IN EUROPE FOR FUTURE POLITICAL ACTION BY REDEFINING THE OLD "PEACE POLICY" IN THE LIGHT OF THE POST-HELSINKI SITUATION, THUS STRENGTHENING COMMUNIST SOLIDARITY IN SUCH ACTION;
- TO IMPRESS WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION WITH ANOTHER PIECE OF PAPER EVIDENCE OF PEACEFUL AND PROGRESSIVE INTENTIONS, TRYING TO STIR UP SUPPORT AMONG THE "PROGRESSIVE AND DEMOCRATIC FORCES" OFTEN HIGHLIGHTED IN THE DOCUMENTS, AND TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM THE MORE MILITANT ASPECTS OF SOVIET AND WP FOREIGN POLICY.

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(1) THE BUCHAREST DOCUMENTS CONSIST OF:

- A DECLARATION "FOR FRESH ADVANCES IN INTERNATIONAL RELAXATION, FOR CONSOLIDATION OF SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT OF CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE";
- CONFIDENTIAL

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- A COMMUNIQUE;
- A PROPOSAL IN THE FORM OF A DRAFT TREATY ON THE NON-FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

THE MAIN INTEREST OF THE CONTENTS OF THE BUCHAREST DOCUMENTS FOR THE ALLIANCE LIES IN THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR ALLIED SECURITY, IN THEIR INDICATIONS OF SOVIET AND WP POSITIONS WITH REGARD TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CSCE FINAL ACT AND THE FORTHCOMING BELGRADE REVIEW CONFERENCE, AND IN THEIR RELEVANCE TO THE INTERNAL RELATIONS WITHIN THE WP. THESE THREE POINTS ARE CONSIDERED IN THE FOLLOWING CHAPTERS.

II. IMPLICATIONS FOR ALLIED SECURITY INTERESTS.

3. THE PRIDE OF PLACE IN THE DECLARATION IS GIVEN TO A REAFFIRMATION OF WP DETERMINATION TO PROMOTE THEIR VERSION OF DETENTE - " WHICH HAS NO SANE ALTERNATIVE" - BY MAKING IT "IRREVERSIBLE" AND TURNING IT INTO A "CONTINUOUS AND EVER MORE VIABLE AND COMPREHENSIVE PROCESS, UNIVERSAL IN SCOPE". BESIDES PRESSING FOR FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT ALONG FAMILIAR SOVIET/WP LINES (SEE PARAGRAPH 8 BELOW), THE MAIN THRUST OF THE BUCHAREST DOCUMENTS IS ON DISARMAMENT MEASURES, DISPLAYING CONCERN FOR THE CONTINUATION OF THE ARMS RACE AND PUTTING THE BLAME FOR IT SQUARELY ON "IMPERIALISM" AND "WORLD REACTION" WHOSE

WARLIKE EFFORTS ALLEGEDLY FORCE THE WP COUNTRIES TO "DIVERT VITAL RESOURCES FROM SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION TO THE DEFENCE OF THE PEACEFUL LABOUR OF WP PEOPLES AND TO THE DETERRENCE OF MILITARISTS".

DISARMEMENT PROPOSALS

4. AS EVIDENCE OF THE WP DEVOTION TO DISARMAMENT, THE DECLARATION CALLS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A GREAT NUMBER OF ALREADY FAMILIAR MEASURES ON THIS FIELD. WITH REGARD TO MBFR, THE DECLARATION CITES RECENT EASTERN INITIATIVES" (PROBABLY THE 19 FEBRUARY, 1976 PROPOSALS REJECTED BY THE ALLIANCE FOR NOT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE EXISTING GROUND FORCE DISPARITIES); IT CONFIDENTIAL

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ALSO CALLS FOR A DEVELOPMENT "ALONG AN ASCENDING LINE" OF A

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 4 USNATO 0444

PROCESS OF REDUCTION OF BOTH NATIONAL AND STATIONED ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS -LEAVING FURTHER DETAILS TO THE IMAGINATION OF THE READER. THE RATHER COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF ONGOING DISARMAMENT EFFORTS CONTAINS NO SURPRISES NOR DOES IT ADD ANYTHING TO THE WELL-KNOWN POSITION OF THE WP COUNTRIES OR GIVES ANY CLUE AS TO HOW TO RESOLVE THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH SO FAR HAVE MADE AGREEMENT IMPOSSIBLE. THE GENERLA IMPRESSION GIVEN BY THIS ENUMERATION IS THAT IT IS MADE MERELY FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES, WITH NO SERIOUS INTENTIONS BEHIND.

PROPOSAL ON NON-FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

5.THE OLD WP PROPSAL - ALSO CONTAINED IN THAT ENUMERATION- OF A COMMITMENT NOT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS FIRST IS, HOWEVER, SINGLED OUT IN THE BUCHAREST COMMUNIQUE AND BY THE FACT THAT THE BUCHAREST CONFERENCE ADOPTED A DRAFT TREATY WHICH WAS SUBSEQUENTLY PRESENTED TO ALL CSCE PARTICIPANTS THROUGH DIPLOMATIC MEANS. SINCE ONLY A FEW OF THE CSCE PARTICIPANTS ARE NUCLEAR-WEAPONS STATES, THIS BROADENING OF THE PROPOSED PLEDGE NOT TO USE SUCH WEAPONS TO ALL OF THEM, APPEARS TO BE A CURIOUS

MANOEUVRE. AS TO THE SUBSTANCE, THE PROPOSAL IS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE ALLIANCE BECAUSE, GIVEN THE GROWING EASTERN SUPERIORITY IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE, A COMMITMENT NOT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS FIRST WOULD DEPRIVE ALLIED COUNTRIES OF THE OPTION TO RESPOND WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO A CONVENTIONAL AGGRESSION  
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WHICH COULD NOT BE HALTED BY WESTERN CONVENTIONAL DEFENCES. ITS ACCEPTANCE WOULD THEREFORE ERODE THE DETERRENCE VALUE OF NATO'S STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE, THUS SERIOUSLY DIMINISHING ALLIED SECURITY.

6. THE ONLY NEW ASPECT OF SOME INTEREST IN THE PROPOSAL IS THAT IT HAS BEEN MADE IN THE REGIONAL CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN SECURITY, ADDRESSING IT TO CSCE PARTICIPANTS. THIS DOES REPRESENT A CERTAIN DEPARTURE FROM EARLIER EASTERN GLOBAL APPROACHES IN THIS FIELD, BUT SINCE THE PROPOSAL CONTRIBUTES NOTHING TO ENHANCE EUROPEAN SECURITY IN ANY REAL SENSE, IT IS DIFFICULT TO TAKE IT AS AN INDICATION OF GREATER EASTERN WILLINGNESS TO REDUCE THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE. ITS MAIN PURPOSE, THEREFORE, MUST BE SEEN TO LIE IN THE FIELD OF PROPAGANDA AND TACTICS: TO CAPITALISE ON A GROWING SENSITIVITY TOWARDS NUCLEAR POWER IN THE WESTERN PUBLIC IN ORDER TO GENERATE PUBLIC PRESSURE ON WESTERN GOVERNMENTS, LEADING EVENTUALLY TO UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS IN THE NUCLEAR POSTURE; POSSIBLY TO DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN WESTERN NATO AND NEUTRAL GOVERNMENTS, OR EVEN BETWEEN NATO GOVERNMENTS, ON WHICH SUCH PRESSURES MAY BE ASSUMED TO WORK WITH DIFFERING STRENGTH; AND HIGHLIGHTING THE NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE IN ORDER TO OFFSET WESTERN CLAIMS IN ORDER THAT THE MOST DESTABILISING FEATURE OF THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE IS THE EASTERN SUPERIORITY IN GROUND FORCES. THE OTHER OBVIOUS EASTERN INTENTION TO USE THE PROPOSAL TO MOVE THE EAST-WEST DISCUSSIONS ON CSCE IMPLEMENTATION IN THE PRE-BELGRADE STAGE TO FOCUS ON SECURITY RATHER THAN ON BASKET III ISSUES IS DISCUSSED BELOW (PARAGRAPH 9).

DISBANDMENT AND NON-EXPANSION OF EXISTING ALLIANCES

7. THE OLD SOVIET/WP PROPOSAL TO DISBAND THE WARSAW PACT AND NATO IN ORDER TO OVERCOME "THE DIVISION OF THE WORLD INTO CONFRONTING MILITARY BLOCS" HAS THIS TIME BEEN ENRICHED BY TWO NEW VARIANTS, ONE PROVIDING THAT THE "MILITARY ORGANISATIONS SHOULD BE LIQUIDATED FIRST", AND THE OTHER PROPOSING THE "SIMULTANEOUS SUSPENSION" OF THE ACCESSION CLAUSES IN THE WARSAW TREATY AND  
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THE NORTH ATLANTIC CHARTER. BOTH THESE ADDITIONS REVEAL THE PROPAGANDISTIC CHARACTER OF THE PROPOSAL, AIMING AT UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE FOR THE EAST, SINCE THE ADOPTION OF THIS PROPOSAL WOULD WORK OUT QUITE DIFFERENTLY FOR EACH OF THE TWO ORGANISATIONS; THE MILITARY INTEGRATION OF THE WP FORCES IS BASED ON A SOVIET

DE FACTO CONTROL OF THE ARMIES OF THE OTHER WP STATES - WHICH WOULD REMAIN VIRTUALLY UNAFFECTED BY THE DISMANTLING OF THE MILITARY FACADE OF THE WP ORTANISATION, WHEREAS IN NATO THE INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURE DOES REPRESENT AN INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT OF AN EFFECTIVE DEFENCE AND DETERRENCE; AND THERE IS NO PROSPECTIVE CANDIDATE FOR ACCESSION TO THE WP, WHEREAS THERE MAY BE SUCH ACCESSIONS TO NATO IN THE FUTURE.

### III. CSCE ASPECTS

8. REFERENCES TO THE CSCE FINAL ACT APPEAR THROUGHOUT THE WIDE RANGE OF SUBJECTS COVERED BY THE DECLARATION. TAKEN TOGETHER, THEY CONSTITUTE A SUBSTANTIAL STATEMENT OF THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE OTHER WP COUNTRIES TOWARDS IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT AND THE FORTHCOMING BELGRADE MEETINGS. THE POSITION IS REHEARSHED IN STANDARD TERMS.

(I) THE FINAL ACT IS VIEWED WITHIN THE OVERALL CONTEXT OF THE POLICY OF RELAXATION OF TENSIONS. IT IS CONSIDERED TO BE AN EVENT OF "HISTORIC SIGNIFICANCE" IN THIS PROCESS, REAFFIRMING THE "TERRITORIAL AND POLITICAL REALITIES" IN EUROPE. TO CARRY FORWARD THIS PROCESS, ALL PARTICIPATING STATES SHOULD TAKE CONSTANT ACTIONS IN THE SPIRIT OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE FINAL ACT, WHICH AS USUAL ARE GIVEN PRIDE OF PLACE.

(II) THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES REAFFIRM THEIR DETERMINATION TO CARRY OUT ALL THE PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT " WHICH IS A SINGLE WHOLE". REALISATION OF THE FINAL ACT IS PRESENTED AS PRICEEDING THROUGH BILATERAL AND MILTI-LATERAL TALKS AND AGREEMENTS; UNILATERAL IMPLEMENTATION IS NOT SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED. ON THE OTHER HAND UNNAMED FORCES OF REACTION ARE ALLEGED TO BE DISTORTING AND CONFIDENTIAL

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MISINTERPRETING THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE FINAL ACT AND SHOWING HESITANCY AND INCONSISTENCY IN ITS IMPLEMENTATION.

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(III) THE DISARMAMENT THEME WHICH IS SO PROMINENT IN THE DECLARATION IS PRESENTED IN A CSEC CONTEXT. THE PROPOSED TREATY ON THE NON-FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS TO BE SIGNED BY CSCE SINGATORIES. AND DISARMAMENT MEASURES ARE TO BE UNDERTAKEN IN THE SPIRIT OF THE HELSINKI PRINCIPLES.

(IV) WITH REGARD TO BASKET III, THERE IS A FORCEFUL REJECTION OF THE USE OF ITS PROVISIONS FOR INTERFERING IN THE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF STATES. STEPS MUST BE TAKEN TO PREVENT THE MASS MEDIA BEING USED AGAINST PEACE AND CO-OPERATION. THE WP COUNTRIES ARE READY TO "NEGOTIATE" IMPLEMENTATION OF BASKET III PROVISIONS, AND BROADER CO-OPERATION IS PLEDGED IN CULTURE, EDUCATION, INFORMATION AND CONTACTS BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS. HOWEVER WHEN FURTHER ELABORATED, BASKET III PROVISIONS ARE PRESENTED PREDOMINANTLY IN TERMS OF CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL CONTACTS. IN SO FAR AS HUMAN RIGHTS ARE MENTIONED, IT IS TO STRESS THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIALIST HUMANITARIANISM, SUCH AS GOOD WORKING CONDITIONS, EMPLOYMENT AND ACCESS TO TECHNOLOGY.

(V) CONSIDERABLE SPACE IS DEVOTED TO THE NEED FOR GREATER ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION, INCLUDING A CALL FOR THE REDUCTION OF TRADE BARRIERS AND FOR THE GRANTING OF MFN TREATMENT CONFIDENTIAL

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AS FORESEEN IN THE FINAL ACT. SUPPORT IS EXPRESSED FOR THE BREZHNEV PROPOSALS AND AN OFFER IS MADE TO HOLD THE ENERGY CONFERENCE IN MOSCOW.

(VI) THE DECLARATION BREAKS NEW GROUND FOR THE WARSAW PACT BY EXPLICITLY LINKING THE CYPRUS PROBLEM WITH THE CSCE: THIS PROBLEM SHOULD BE SETTLED IN THE BASIS OF THE SPIRIT AND LETTER OF THE FINAL ACT.

(VII) THE BELGRADE MEETINGS WILL ALLOW AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS "ON THE POSITIVE EXPERIENCE OF CO-OPERATION AMONG STATES" (THERE IS NOT REFERENCE TO ANY NEED TO CONSIDER OBSTACLES AND GAPS IN IMPLEMENTATION) AND ON FUTURE EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION.

9. THE DECLARATION SEEMS INTENDED TO ESTABLISH A BASIC FRAMEWORK FOR THE EASTERN POSITION AT THE BELGRADE MEETINGS. IT MAKES CLEAR THAT AT THESE MEETINGS THE WEST SHOULD EXPECT NO SIGNIFICANT MODIFICATION OF THE POLICIES FOLLOWED BY THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES BOTH DURING AND SINCE THE CSCE NEGOTIATIONS. NOT SURPRISINGLY, THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES HAVE MAINTAINED THE TACTIC OF HIGHLIGHTING THOSE SUBJECTS ON WHICH THE EAST WILL PRESUMABLY ATTEMPT TO CONCENTRATE ATTENTION DURING THE BELGRADE MEETINGS: SECURITY MATTERS INCLUDING DISARMAMENT, CERTAIN

PRINCIPLES, ESPECIALLY THAT ON THE INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS, ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND STATE-ORGANISED CULTURAL ACTIVITIES. THE DECLARATION ATTEMPTS TO DEMONSTRATE SERIOUS EFFORTS BY THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES TO TAKE IMPLEMENTATION INITIATIVES IN THESE AREAS AND THIS THEME IS LIKELY TO BE CONTINUED IN BELGRADE. THE DECLARATION MAY PRESAGE EASTERN INITIATIVES AT BELGRADE ON SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS, INCLUDING THE NON-FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROPOSAL, AS WELL AS SOME SORT OF INITIATIVE ON CYPRUS.

10. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE WP COUNTRIES, BY FOCUSING ON THESE SUBJECTS, ARE TRYING TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM THE HUMAN  
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RIGHTS AND HUMAN CONTACTS AREA WHICH GIVES THEM THE MOST TROUBLE, A TACTIC WHICH THEY CAN BE EXPECTED TO PURSUE AT BELGRADE. THE FIRMNESS WITH WHICH ALLEGED ATTEMPTS TO USE BASKET III PROVISIONS FOR INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS ARE REJECTED, AND THE STRESS LAID ON THE NEED FOR THE MASS MEDIA TO SERVE THE CAUSE OF PEACE, APPEAR TO BE SIGNALS THAT THE EAST WILL CONTINUE TO KEEP A TIGHT CONTROL ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS ON THE FREER FLOW OF PEOPLE AND INFORMATION. THOSE SIGNALS ARE NO DOUBT DIRECTED PRIMARILY TOWARDS WESTERN AND OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN BELGRADE BUT THEY MAY ALSO BE INTENDED FOR PUBLIC OPINION WITHIN THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES THEMSELVES.

11. THIS FIRM LINE, COMBINED WITH THE ATTEMPT TO EXPLAIN THE BROAD PHILOSOPHY BEHIND THE POSITIONS TAKEN ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS, MAY REFLECT THE CONCERN OF THE SOVIET LEADERS AT WHAT THEY ARE LIKELY TO REGARD AS DIFFICULT TIMES AHEAD AT BELGRADE. PRESSURES FROM WITHIN THAT ARE APPEARING IN VARIOUS WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES (CZECHOSLOVAKIA, GDR, POLAND, USSR) CONCERNING HUMAN RIGHTS AND BASKET III ISSUES MUST ADD TO THE CONCERN THAT WARSAW PACT GOVERNMENTS ALREADY HAVE ABOUT SIMILAR PRESSURES FROM WESTERN SOURCES AND ABOUT THE QUESTIONING IN THE WEST OF THE NATURE AND VALUE OF DETENTE. REPEATED REFERENCES TO THE THINKING AND WISHES OF "PEOPLE" IS AN INDICATION THAT THE WARSAW PACT MAY ALREADY BE ANTICIPATING WESTERN EMPHASIS ON PUBLIC OPINION.

12. IT IS LIKELY THAT THE EMPHASIS ON IMPLEMENTATION ON A BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL BASIS RATHER THAN BY UNILATERAL ACTION CAN ALSO BE EXPECTED TO BE A FEATURE OF THE EASTERN POSITION IN BELGRADE.

13. THE RATHER DETAILED STATEMENT OF THE POSITION OF THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES IN THE DECLARATION SUGGESTS THAT THE SOVIET UNION INTENDS TO ENSURE THAT THE SAME DEGREE OF CLOSE COHESION AMONG THE EASTERN COUNTRIES ACHIEVED DURING THE HELSINKI AND GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE MAINTAINED AT BELGRADE. ALTHOUGH ROMANIA IS ALREADY SHOWING SIGNS OF WISHING ONCE MORE  
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TO BE THE EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL PATTERN OF EASTERN SOLIDARITY,  
THE SOVIET UNION MAY HOPE THAT THE DECLARATION WILL HELP TO KEEP  
ROMANIA IN LINE TO A GREATER EXTENT THAN AT HELSINKI AND GENEVA.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 4 OF 4 USNATO 0444

4. BEGIN TEXT OF INFORMAL MISSION TRANSLATION:

IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS WITHIN THE WARSAW  
PACT

14. ONE OF THE SOVIET UNION'S FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVES IN  
GOING TO BUCHAREST WAS CERTAINLY TO HIGHTEN ITS HOLD ON THE  
FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE VARIOUS EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES  
AND IN PARTICULAR TO PUT A BRAKE ON ROMANIA'S TENDENCY  
TO BE A KIND OF LONE RIDER IN ITS RELATIONS WITH THE  
REST OF THE WORLD.

15. IT IS PROBABLY FROM THIS VIEWPOINT THAT  
ONE SHOULD ANALYZE THE DECISION TO CREATE A COM-  
MITTEE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS ALONG THE LINES OF  
WHAT HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE MILITARY SPHERE IN 1969  
WHEN A COMMITTEE OF DEFENSE MINISTERS WAS CREATED. AT THAT TIME,  
FOLLOWING THE CZECHOSLOVAK CRISIS, THESE REFORMS WERE AIMED  
AT EASING THE DIS-CONTENT OF CERTAIN SMALL COUNTRIES BY ASSOC-  
IATING THEM MORE CLOSELY WITH THE COLLECTIVE DECISION-MAKING  
PROCESS. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE MEASURES DECIDED AT BUCHAREST  
RESPOND TO A SIMILAR CONCERN; REDUCING THE NEED FOR BILATERAL  
MEETINGS WITH THE USSR, IN WHICH MOSCOW'S POLITICAL WEIGHT  
GIVES IT A DECISIVE INFLUENCE, THESE MEASURES CAN HELP SLOW  
DOWN FUTURE CENTRIFUGAL TENDENCIES THUS PERMITTING  
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"GREATER SOLIDARITY WITHIN THE SOCIALIST COMMUNITY". THE SAME  
CONCERN WOULD APPEAR TO BE THE ORIGIN OF THE CREATION OF A MILI-  
LATERAL SECRETARIAT INTENDED TO REPLACE THE ONE CREATED IN JANUARY



1956 AT THE SAME TIME AS THE PERMANENT COMMISSION. A CERTAIN PARALLELISM WITH THE NATO STRUCTURE IS APPARENT. IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT THE ROMANIANS ARE GIVING THEMSELVES CREDIT FOR INITIATING THESE REFORMS; THE ROMANIANS MAY HOPE THAT THE PRESENT COMPROMISE WILL HAVE SOME CHANCE OF REDUCING THE RISK OF GREATER MILITARY INTEGRATION BY PUTTING MORE EMPHASIS ON THE POLITICAL ASPECT OF THE PACT. NEVERTHELESS, THE ABSENCE OF DETAILED INFORMATION ON HOW THE NEW ORGANS WILL FUNCTION LEADS ONE TO BE CAREFUL IN DRAWING CONCLUSIONS.

16. PART IV OF THE DECLARATION, WHICH IS DEDICATED TO "COOPERATION" WITHIN THE SOCIALIST COMMUNITY, IS AS INTERESTING FOR WHAT IT CONTAINS AS FOR WHAT IS ABSENT. AMONG THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES "PROLETARIAN NATIONALISM" IS REPLACED BY "INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY" AS WAS THE CASE AT EAST BERLIN. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE IS NO MENTION OF DIFFERING PATHS TO SOCIALISM, DESPITE THE FORMAL RECOGNITION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY OF RIGHTS, OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND OF NON-INTERFERENCE; IT IS SPECIFIED THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES DO NOT HAMPER RELATIONS WITH OTHER EUROPEAN STATES. WE NOTE THE ABSENCE OF THE TERM "COORDINATION" WITH THE EXPRESSED OBJECTIVE BEING "CONCRETE COOPERATION" IN FACT, THE REAL SOVIET INTENTIONS APPEAR IN THE IZVESTIA EDITORIAL OF NOVEMBER 30: THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ATTACH MAJOR IMPORTANCE "TO THE STRENGTHENING AND EXPANSION OF COOPERATION IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE AND TO COORDINATION OF THEIR EFFORTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE".

17. THE NOVEMBER 25-26 MEETING, IN CONCLUSION, APPEARS TO CROWN THE SOVIET UNION'S RECENT EFFORTS TO TIGHTEN COHESION IN ITS CAMP; THE MEETING ALSO PERHAPS FORESHADOWS MORE COORDINATED POLICY WITHIN THE WARSAW PACT. THIS RESULT HAS BEEN REACHED THANKS TO A SERIES OF COMPROMISES AND DIFFERING VIEWS  
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WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BECOME APPARENT ON A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS. NEVERTHELESS, A FRAMEWORK IS TAKING SHAPE FOR CLOSE COOPERATION, EVEN IF THIS IS NOT THE COORDINATION DESIRED BY MOSCOW. IT IS DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE TO WHAT EXTENT THE CRISIS IN WESTERN ECONOMIES HAS ENCOURAGED CERTAIN EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO ORIENT THEMSELVES MORE TOWARD MOSCOW. THE ESSENTIAL QUESTION IS, HOWEVER, THAT OF THE EXTENT OF ROMANIAN CONCESSIONS AND OF ROMANIA'S PLACE WITHIN THE PACT.  
END TEXT. STRAUSS-HUPE

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## Message Attributes

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**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 3680905  
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**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** INTERNATIONAL STAFF PAPER ON WARSAW PACT SUMMIT MEETING  
**TAGS:** NATO, PFOR, PARM  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
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**Review Markings:**  
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